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Abstract
We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to
adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they
can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot–Nash
outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot–
Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents’
standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg
equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and
rent-seeking games.
r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C72; C73; L13; H41
Keywords: Accumulation games; Cournot–Nash outcome; Stackelberg outcome
1. Introduction
In a variety of settings, agents repeatedly interact and take irreversible actions
before payoffs accrue. For instance, donors can make multiple non-refundable
contributions to a public good, lobbies repeatedly engage in rent-seeking activities to
influence a policy decision,1 and duopolists can add to their previous stock of output
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before the market clears. Such games have two main features: (i) Before payoffs
occur, agents have multiple opportunities to vary their strategic variable and to
observe their opponent’s most recent strategy choice; but (ii) they can only
accumulate their strategic variable over time.
With some exceptions discussed below, studies of such games have assumed that
agents make their choices once and that they interact either in a standard Cournot–
Nash or Stackelberg fashion. While these modeling approaches provide valuable
insights into the nature of agents’ choices and the equilibrium outcomes, a more
realistic specification of such games should embody the two elements discussed
above. Our objectives in this paper are to determine the consequences of the
possibility of ‘‘strategic accumulation’’ for a large set of games, and to examine the
implications in a variety of applications. The contribution of this paper is twofold:
On the technical side, we are able to solve this set of games in a unified manner thus
allowing us to highlight the common themes; and, on the application side, we show
how some predictions of previously analyzed models might change dramatically once
we account for the dynamics and irreversibility of initial actions. As a byproduct, our
study also allows us to identify the environments where leadership roles arise
endogenously.
A brief preview of our main findings and the organization of our paper are as
follows. We present the model in Section 2. Two agents are present whose
preferences and strategy spaces are common knowledge. Agents simultaneously
make initial choices, and, after these are observed, simultaneously choose whether to
increase their strategic variable. Payoffs depend on the accumulated values.
In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium set. We show that the equilibrium set
can be delineated using the standard one-period reaction functions and the standard
Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg outcomes. This characterization provides a
convenient program for identifying the equilibrium possibilities in different
scenarios.
Next we focus on when the Cournot–Nash outcome is the unique equilibrium. The
necessary and sufficient condition is simply that each agent’s standard Stackelberg-
leader choice is less than his Cournot–Nash amount. This finding provides insight
into the nature of the accumulation game. An example with this outcome is the
standard model of private contributions to a public good where agents would like to
free ride. A standard Stackelberg leader would free ride by committing to a low
contribution—below the Cournot–Nash amount—knowing that this would induce a
relatively high contribution by the follower. If, however, the Stackelberg leader could
contribute again along with the ‘‘follower,’’ then the leader’s incentive to do so
would lead back to the Cournot–Nash outcome. This intuition holds generally in this
case thereby ruling out all but the Cournot–Nash outcome.
In other settings, equilibria in the accumulation game are equivalent to one or
both of the standard Stackelberg outcomes. An example is duopoly quantity
competition by producers of complements. Here initial choice of the standard
Stackelberg leader’s amount constitutes a credible commitment to maintaining that
output because it exceeds the Cournot–Nash quantity (and this initial choice is an
equilibrium strategy). The other possibility is to have a continuum of equilibria
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along one or both agents’ (standard) reaction functions between the Cournot–Nash
and Stackelberg outcomes. Here equilibria with ‘‘partial leadership’’ arise. Both
agents take their actions in the initial period, the ‘‘partial follower’’ making a
commitment that limits the cost of being a follower in these cases.
In Section 4, we provide some specific applications. In Section 5, we examine the
effects of discounting which is not an element of the basic model. The noteworthy
finding here is that (even slight) discounting eliminates the possibility of the
continuum of equilibria, but two modified Stackelberg and the second-period
Cournot–Nash outcomes remain as the only possible equilibria. The outcome that
prevails in equilibrium however depends on the underlying game structure as well as
the discount rate.
Settings also exist where agents can only reduce their earlier choices over time.
Duopolists competing in price may be bound to no higher than preannounced prices
to keep customer goodwill and/or to avoid antitrust scrutiny. Political candidates
announcing preferred tax rates may face prohibitive political costs of then favoring
higher rates, but not so for lower rates. Not surprisingly, our techniques and results
for the accumulation game can be applied to the ‘‘decumulation game’’ by an
appropriate change of variables, which we demonstrate in Section 6. We also
consider an extension to an arbitrary number of periods in Section 6, where we show
that, with no discounting, adding more periods to the accumulation game changes
neither the equilibrium set nor agents’ payoffs. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
The appendix contains all proofs.
Before proceeding, we relate and distinguish our paper from closely related
previous work. Saloner [18] solves the duopoly output game of producers of a
homogeneous product with two production periods, which is a special case of the
problem we study. Pal [16] extends Saloner’s analysis by introducing cost changes
over time.2 Our analysis of discounting is close to his, though ours applies to a much
wider range of cases and thus yields novel insights. We further discuss this point in
Section 5. More recently, Henkel [10] examines the value of partial commitment by
the first-mover. Our model differs from his in that we allow both agents to move
initially and then both agents can revise their initial decisions. In Romano and
Yildirim [17], using a fairly general utility function, we analyze a two-period
contribution game to a public good to determine the role of announcements in fund-
raising activities. One version of the contribution game we studied is a special case of
the problem analyzed here. Admati and Perry [1] investigate the conditions under
which two agents can complete a jointly valued discrete project when they take turns
making contributions toward its completion. Our model can be applied to a similar
problem but with continuous public good and where each party can contribute each
period.3 Marx and Matthews [15] consider a more general model along the lines of
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3Varian [23] also considers sequential contributions to a continuous public good assuming each agent
can contribute only once, thus facilitating Stackelberg leadership. Our model complements this analysis by
highlighting the commitment problem when multiple contributions are allowed. We discuss this point
further below.
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Admati and Perry, including allowing agents to contribute in any period. They
obtain more ‘‘positive’’ results regarding the likely completion of the project and
attribute this primarily to the change in timing of the game.4 As we discuss below, a
similar intuition arises in our two-period model with continuous payoff functions.
Hamilton and Slutsky [8,9], and Van Damme and Hurkens [22] analyze endogenous
timing games having firms choose not only how much to produce but also in which
period to produce. Our analysis complements this literature by allowing positive
production in each period.
2. The model
Two agents, i ¼ 1; 2, take continuous actions yti simultaneously in each of two
periods, t ¼ 1; 2, before payoffs accrue.5 The first-period choices are observed before
the second-period choices are made. Let Yi  y1i þ y2i denote the cumulative value of
agent i’s strategic variable. The total action is bounded and agents cannot make
negative choices: y1iA½0; Ii  Fi and y2iA½0; Ii  y1i : The lower bound of zero on the
latter set characterizes the accumulation game.6
Agents receive payoffs at the end of the second period, with payoff or utility
function: Ui ¼ UiðYi; YjÞ: Thus, we assume the timing of actions is irrelevant to the
payoff function. This is at least a good approximation when payoffs dwarf time
costs, as when the period of interaction is short. Also, for applications where actions
correspond to one-sided binding commitments, as sometimes with an announced
political position, this is the appropriate assumption. In any case, we show in Section
5 that the fundamental results are unchanged with the introduction of discounting.
Both utility functions and the action spaces are common knowledge, and Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies is the equilibrium concept we adopt.
Our analytical approach employs the standard one-period reaction functions and
Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg outcomes for the total actions ðY1; Y2Þ: Thus, define
the reaction function of agent i as:
f iðYjÞ ¼ arg max
Yi
UiðYi; YjÞ: ð1Þ
Let G0 indicate the one-period Cournot–Nash game and Gi indicate the standard
Stackelberg game where agent i leads. We write the Cournot–Nash outcome as
ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ; which occurs at the intersection of the reaction functions.
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accumulation. Our model differs from their models in two significant ways: First, we consider finitely
repeated games. More importantly, while Gale restricts attention to games with positive spillovers between
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impose no such restrictions and thus consider more applications. We emphasize that predictions vary
widely with the properties of the payoff functions.
5Where it is obvious by context, assume that i; j ¼ 1; 2, iaj and that t ¼ 1; 2.
6 If the lower bound on y2i were y1i ; then the problem would be equivalent to the one-period game,
making any initial action meaningless.
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Similarly, we write the Stackelberg outcome where i is the leader as ðYiðGiÞ; YjðGiÞÞ;
i.e.,
YiðGiÞ  arg max
Yi
UiðYi; f jðYiÞÞ and YjðGiÞ  f jðYiðGiÞÞ: ð2Þ
We focus here on sufficiently well-behaved games for our analysis and make the
following assumptions that hold in many applications.
Assumption 1. (a) Both UiðYi; YjÞ and UiðYi; f jðYiÞÞ are twice continuously
differentiable, and strictly quasi-concave in ðYi; YjÞ and Yi respectively.
(b) f iðYjÞ is strictly monotonic for both agents.
(c) The Cournot–Nash and each Stackelberg equilibrium in the one-period game
are unique and interior.
Several remarks are in order. First, the assumptions on UiðYi; YjÞ imply that f i is a
continuous and differentiable function. Furthermore, since the strategy set Fi is a
nonempty compact convex set, these assumptions also imply the existence of a pure
strategy Cournot–Nash equilibrium in the one-period game (see, e.g., [6, Theorem
1.2]). Second, the assumptions on UiðYi; f jðYiÞÞ imply that there is a unique
Stackelberg outcome for each agent.7 The strict quasi-concavity of UiðYi; f jðYiÞÞ
also means that a Stackelberg leader’s payoff increases monotonically if we move
along the follower’s reaction function from any point toward the Stackelberg
outcome. Third, while we require the monotonicity of reaction functions in part (b),
we show by example in Section 4 that it is not always needed for our results. Note
however that the monotonicity of reaction functions does not guarantee the
uniqueness of the one-period Cournot–Nash equilibrium, which we assume in
part (c).8
Based on our assumptions above, we identify 10 qualitatively unique cases as
defined by the slopes of the agents’ reaction functions and whether each agent’s
payoff increases or decreases in his rival’s strategic variable.9 For example, duopoly
output setters that produce complements have upward sloping reaction functions,
each with their payoff increasing in their rival’s output. Another case is illustrated by
the standard model of voluntary contributions to a public good (see (3) below).
Again each agent has a payoff that increases in the other agent’s strategic variable,
but now with downward sloping reaction functions. We will see that the nature of
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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8See, e.g., Tirole [20, p. 226] for a discussion of multiplicity of Cournot–Nash equilibrium, and sufficient
conditions to ensure uniqueness. One such condition is that the derivatives of reaction functions are each
less than 1 around the intersection points.
9Three cases have each agent with upward sloping reaction function, one with each agent’s payoff
increasing in the rival’s strategic variable, another with each agent’s payoff decreasing in the rival’s
strategic variable, and the third with one agent’s payoff increasing and the other agent’s payoff decreasing
in the rival’s choice. Analogously, three cases exist that have each agent with downward sloping reaction
function, and four cases exist with each agent having opposite slopes of their reaction functions.
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equilibria varies across these cases. All 10 cases have important applications as
further discussed below.
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we record the following preliminary
finding which compares the Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg outcomes.
Proposition 1. Agent i’s Stackelberg-leader amount is greater than (less than) (the same
as) his Cournot–Nash amount if and only if
@Ui
@Yj
@f j
@Yi

G0
is positive (negative) (zero).
All proofs are contained in the appendix.
3. The accumulation game
To determine the set of equilibria, we start with the second period. Upon
observing ðy1i ; y1j Þ and conjecturing Yj ¼ y1j þ y2j ; agent i solves the following second-
period program.
½P max
Yi
UiðYi; YjÞ
s:t:
y1ipYipIi
Together with (1), the solution to ½P is
Yi ¼ maxfy1i ; f iðYjÞg:
This observation leads us to the following lemma that determines the equilibrium
strategies in the second period.
Lemma 1. The following strategies constitute the unique continuation equilibrium
strategies in the second period.
y2i ðy1i ; y1j Þ ¼
0 if y1iXf
iðy1j Þ and y1jXf jðy1i Þ;
YiðG0Þ  y1i if y1ipYiðG0Þ and y1jpYjðG0Þ;
0 if y1iXYiðG0Þ and y1jpf jðy1i Þ;
f iðy1j Þ  y1i if y1jXYjðG0Þ and y1ipf iðy1j Þ:
8>><
>>>:
9>>=
>>>;
The strategies in Lemma 1 were shown by Saloner [18] to be the equilibrium
continuation strategies in his analysis of homogenous good duopolists with two
production periods. The appendix shows that these constitute the unique continua-
tion equilibrium strategies in the more general setting here. Saloner [18] does not
point out that this strategy is unique in his paper, perhaps taking this as clear.
To present the main finding of the paper, we define the following outcome sets:
S1  fðY1; Y2ÞAF1  F2 such that YiXf iðYjÞg:
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S2  fðY1; Y2ÞAF1  F2 such that Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ for at least one agentg:
S3  fðY1; Y2ÞAF1  F2 such that YipYiðGiÞ whenever Yiaf iðYjÞg:
S4 fðY1; Y2ÞAF1  F2 such that if Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ;
then either YjXYjðGjÞ or YiXYiðGjÞg:
S5 
ðY1; Y2ÞAF1  F2 such that if Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ; then UiðYi; YjÞX
maxY˜i U
iðY˜i; f jðY˜iÞÞ s:t: f jðY˜iÞXYj and Y˜iXf iðf jðY˜iÞÞ
( )
;
where i; j ¼ 1; 2; iaj in each set. Let S denote their intersection: S  S1-S2-
S3-S4-S5: Together with Lemma 1, the following theorem provides a convenient
program for finding equilibrium outcomes in a variety of settings.
Theorem 1. A ðYi; YjÞ pair is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it is in S.
The sets that delineate S are based on the usual definitions of reaction functions
and the one-shot Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg outcomes so Theorem 1 is easy to
apply. Note that due to Assumption 1 S is never empty, so Theorem 1 implies
existence as well.10 We illustrate specific applications in Section 4.
In general, equilibria described in Theorem 1 will be a subset of the outcomes of
those in the Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg models and including points on the
reaction functions in between. When not the Cournot–Nash outcome, equilibrium
will entail an element of leadership by one agent. Even so, one can see from the
applications in the next section and from the Proof of Theorem 1 that all actions can
occur in the first period for all equilibrium outcomes including the Stackelberg ones,
unless the Stackelberg outcomes are the only equilibria. Hence, observing agents
taking actions initially and doing nothing later need not imply that they are playing
the one-period Cournot–Nash game.
Next we investigate the settings for which the Cournot–Nash outcome is the
unique equilibrium. Understanding these cases is important in two ways: First, these
are the cases where the irreversibility of early actions is not binding in equilibrium.
That is, the same Cournot–Nash outcome would arise if agents could costlessly
decrease as well as increase their previous actions in the second period. Second, these
are the cases where no agent is able to exercise leadership. We provide the necessary
and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the Cournot–Nash outcome in
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in the appendix, when both reaction functions are downward-sloping, the constraint set for the
maximization in S5 is a singleton with Y˜i ¼ YiðG0Þ; and thus the condition is automatically satisfied. One
interesting case in which S5 is binding occurs when firms produce complementary products (see Section 4
for details) and they are sufficiently asymmetric that one Stackelberg outcome Pareto dominates the other.
In such a case, S5 rules out the Pareto-dominated Stackelberg outcome as an equilibrium in the
accumulation game, yielding the remaining Stackelberg outcome as the unique equilibrium outcome.
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Proposition 2. The one-period Cournot–Nash outcome, ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ; is the unique
equilibrium outcome if and only if each agent’s Stackelberg-leader amount is less than
or equal to his corresponding Cournot–Nash amount: YiðGiÞpYiðG0Þ for i ¼ 1; 2.
Proposition 2 is most easily interpreted by its sufficiency part. Note first that if
agent i were to engender an outcome with his leadership, he would take a first period
action less than or equal to his one-period Stackelberg amount, YiðGiÞ; in
equilibrium as required by S3: The condition YiðGiÞpYiðG0Þ would then require
that agent i be below his reaction function. However, such a low first period action
would also give agent i an incentive to add to it in the second period, destroying his
leadership commitment. Proposition 2 simply asserts that if the condition
YiðGiÞpYiðG0Þ applies to both agents, then neither can exercise a leadership role.
Furthermore, Proposition 1 above helps identify the cases for which these conditions
are satisfied. We now provide specific applications.
4. Applications
4.1. Private provision of public goods
Consider the standard model of private contributions to a public good where
agent i ði ¼ 1; 2Þ allocates his income, Ii; between the numeraire consumption, xi;
and the private contribution, Yi; to a public good. The utility function is given by
Ui ¼ Uiðxi; Yi þ YjÞ; ð3Þ
where Ui is increasing in its arguments.11 Refer to Fig. 1. Under mild restrictions,
both agents have downward sloping reaction functions. Since each agent benefits
from the other agent’s contribution,
@Ui
@Yj
40; and Proposition 1 implies that
YiðGiÞoYiðG0Þ: Intuitively, if agent i could commit to a lower contribution level
than YiðG0Þ; then he could gain since this would induce a larger contribution from
agent j: While one can easily conclude from Proposition 2 that the Cournot–Nash
outcome is the unique outcome here, one can also apply Theorem 1. Note that
S1-S2-S3 yields only point G0; which satisfies S4 as well. The constraint set on the
maximization in S5 contains only point G0 (see footnote 10), so the inequality in S5 is
satisfied with equality. The Proof of Theorem 1 shows that y1i ¼ YiðG0Þ; y1j ¼ YjðG0Þ;
and y2i ¼ y2j ¼ 0 make up an equilibrium.12
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12 In fact, there is a continuum of equilibria here in that any y1ipYiðG0Þ followed by y2i ¼ YiðG0Þ  y1i
for both agents constitutes an equilibrium. However, all equilibria yield the same Cournot–Nash outcome
so this multiplicity is not very important.
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To gain intuition, suppose that agent i could commit to contributing YiðGiÞ in the
initial period and to contributing nothing in the second period. Then agent j can do
no better than to choose the corresponding follower amount, YjðGiÞ; either in
the first period or in the second period. But this is not an equilibrium in the
accumulation game because agent i would prefer to increase his contribution in
the second period, i.e., f iðYjÞ4YiðGiÞ as seen in Fig. 1. This argument rules out only
the Stackelberg outcome. However, if agent i chooses Yi not on his reaction
function, then the equilibrium condition in S3 of Theorem 1 requires that
YipYiðGiÞ: Since agent i cannot commit to maintaining YiðGiÞ; it is not surprising
that he cannot commit to maintaining any lower amount. Both agents must then be
on their reaction functions in equilibrium.
In the standard public good game above, Varian [23] shows that the total
equilibrium contribution in a Stackelberg game where agents contribute only once is
less than the one-period Cournot–Nash total. The dynamic element in the
Stackelberg game exacerbates the free-rider problem. Our analysis highlights the
difficulty of committing to leadership when multiple contributions are feasible. In
fact, if the leader has no mechanism to commit not to increase his contribution later,
a first-mover ‘‘advantage’’ vanishes in equilibrium. This helps alleviate the additional
free-rider problem from sequential moves. This intuition provides a perspective as to
why Marx and Mathews [15] find a more ‘‘positive’’ result regarding the completion
of a joint project than do Admati and Perry [1] as we noted in the Introduction.
Now consider another version of contribution games and suppose that two
politicians or business leaders contribute to a public good and are concerned mainly
about their relative contribution to gain voter or customer goodwill. Let their utility
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Fig. 1. Standard public good game.
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functions be given by
Ui ¼ xiðki þ Yi  YjÞ; ð4Þ
where xi ¼ Ii  Yi is numeraire consumption, Ii is agent i’s (exogenous) income, and
ki is a parameter on ðmaxf0; Ij  Iig; IiÞ:13 Refer to Fig. 2. Each agent has upward
sloping reaction function and dislikes the other’s contribution:
@Ui
@Yj
o0: Proposition 1
then implies YiðGiÞoYiðG0Þ for each agent i and so Proposition 2 applies. Here, a
Stackelberg leader would contribute less than the Cournot–Nash amount to soften
the competition in the contribution game. By a similar argument to that above, such
a first-period contribution is not a credible commitment in the accumulation game,
leading to the Cournot–Nash outcome as the unique equilibrium outcome.
4.2. Differentiated product duopolists
Consider the following model first proposed by Dixit [4] and also analyzed by
Singh and Vives [19]. Duopolists produce differentiated products with inverse
demand function for firm i:
pi ¼ ai  biqi  gqj; i; j ¼ 1; 2 and iaj; ð5Þ
with obvious notation and where ai; bi; ðb1b2  g2Þ; and ðaibj  ajgÞ are all assumed
positive. Products are substitutes (complements) if g is positive (negative). Duopolist i
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Fig. 2. Contribution game with prestige.
13The example also requires that 2Ii4Ij :
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has constant average cost mi; so profits are given by: Pi ¼ ðpi  miÞqi: Quantities are
the strategic variables. Reaction functions are given by:
f iðqjÞ ¼ ai  mi
2bi
 g
2bi
qj: ð6Þ
With a few parameter restrictions, the problem is well-behaved with all the concavity
and uniqueness properties satisfying Assumption 1 above.14
Consider first the accumulation game when products are substitutes, i.e., g40:
This case coincides with Saloner’s [18] model and is depicted in Fig. 3. Applying
Theorem 1, one can see that S1-S2-S3 consists of points on each reaction function
between G0 and Gi; i ¼ 1; 2. The requirements in S4 and S5 are not binding, yielding
the following set of equilibrium outcomes: S ¼ fðqi; qjÞ such that qi ¼ f iðqjÞ and
qiðG0ÞpqipqiðGiÞ; i; j ¼ 1; 2; iajg:
As shown by Saloner, the equilibrium set is comprised of a continuum of points
along the reaction functions between and including the Cournot–Nash and
Stackelberg outcomes. As discussed further below, with the exception of the
Stackelberg outcomes, both agents necessarily make first-period choices in S and
choose zero in the second period.
The case with complements, i.e., go0; is depicted in Fig. 4. Applying Theorem 1 to
the case of symmetric or nearly symmetric agents, one finds that the set S1-S2-S3
consists of points on each reaction function between G0 and Gi; i ¼ 1; 2: The
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Fig. 3. Quantity competition with substitutes.
14For example, in the symmetric case b4a m40 is sufficient. The upper bounds on the quantities can
be set arbitrarily high.
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requirements of S4 reduce the candidate equilibrium set to just the two Stackelberg
points, G1 and G2: In Fig. 4, both G1 and G2 satisfy S5; since both agents prefer
following to leading (see also footnote 10). Thus, only the Stackelberg outcomes are
equilibria. The Proof of Theorem 1 (in the appendix) shows that Gi; i ¼ 1; 2, is an
equilibrium with y1i ¼ YiðGiÞ; y2i ¼ y1j ¼ 0; and y2j ¼ YjðGiÞ:15,16
In both the cases of substitutes and complements, producing the Stackelberg
output the first period—while the other duopolist produces zero or a low amount—is
an equilibrium strategy with a credible commitment to not produce more later.
Given duopolist j produces say zero in the first period, engendering the Stackelberg
outcome Gi is the best that duopolist i can do. With q
1
j ¼ 0; agent i prefers q1i ¼
qiðGiÞ; any higher q1i would induce a continuation equilibrium further away from Gi
on j’s reaction function. Given q1i ¼ qiðGiÞ; j can do no better than produce nothing
in the first period with then an outcome of Gi: In the case of complements (Fig. 4),
both agents making initial choices below the Cournot–Nash outputs would lead to
the latter in the continuation equilibrium. Either agent prefers to increase output the
first period and effect his leadership outcome. If leadership in the sense of ending up
on the other’s reaction function is to result, it is best to choose the Stackelberg
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Fig. 4. Quantity competition with complements.
15Gi also arises as an equilibrium with the same choices by agent i and a set of ‘‘low’’ choices y
1
j followed
by y2j ¼ YjðGiÞ-y1j : This multiplicity is again not very important since the final outcomes, including
payoffs, are invariant.
16Near symmetry simply guarantees that S5 will not rule out one Stackelberg equilibrium.
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leadership amount initially. Hence, only the Stackelberg equilibria arise in the case of
complements.
In the case of substitutes (Fig. 3), other equilibria arise with ‘‘partial-’’ or ‘‘limited-
leadership.’’ Here agents do not like to follow, i.e., their payoffs rise moving from
their Stackelberg follower’s point along their reaction function to the Cournot–Nash
point. By committing initially to an output in this range, the partial follower
engenders the corresponding point on his reaction function as the equilibrium. The
partial leader does best by choosing in the first period the corresponding output
(with both choosing zero in the second-period continuation equilibrium). Given the
partial leader’s first-period choice, the partial follower is actually indifferent to
choosing any output level up to the point on his reaction function, the continuation
equilibrium at the same point on the partial follower’s reaction function in any case.
However, choosing less than the level on his reaction function would allow the
partial leader to increase output the first period and move toward his Stackelberg
leadership point in the continuation equilibrium. Both making choices on the partial
follower’s reaction function in the first period constitute the only equilibrium choices
with partial leadership in the two-period game, the partial follower’s equilibrium
choice curtailing the effects of the other agent’s leadership.
4.3. A rent-seeking model
Consider the following stylized rent-seeking model first developed by Tullock [21].
Two risk-neutral parties have opposed interests over a binary decision of a policy
maker and take actions to influence that decision. Examples of such decisions
include awarding of monopoly rights or government contracts, or passing of
disputed legislation. Rent-seeking activities might take the form of political
lobbying, bribes, or campaign contributions to political candidates. Party i attaches
a positive value equal to Ii if the decision is in its favor and zero otherwise. The
likelihood of party i’s winning is given by:
PiðY1; Y2Þ ¼ Yi
Y1 þ Y2 if Y140 or Y240; and Pið0; 0Þ ¼ 1=2; ð7Þ
where YiX0 and denotes i’s rent seeking expenditures or effort. Thus party i has
payoff function:
UiðY1; Y2Þ ¼ Yi
Y1 þ Y2Ii  Yi: ð8Þ
From here, party i’s reaction function can be found as:17
f iðYjÞ ¼ ðIiYjÞ
1=2  Yj if YjAð0; Ii;
0 if Yj4Ii:
( )
ð9Þ
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without affecting any results.
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Although most analyses of this model have used the simultaneous-move
assumption and focused on the Cournot–Nash equilibrium, Linster [12] for one
examines the Stackelberg alternative and compares the resulting outcomes. Fig. 5
depicts an example with asymmetric parties ðI14I2Þ: Observe that f iðYjÞ is
increasing for YjAð0; Ii=4Þ and decreasing for YjAðIi=4; Ii), with maximum of Ii=4
when Yj ¼ Ii=4: Hence, f ið:Þ is nonmonotonic, violating part (b) of Assumption 1
above. Even so, we will show below that our results hold. The Cournot–Nash and
Stackelberg equilibria exist and are unique. Assuming interior solutions in the
Stackelberg cases (see below):
YiðG0Þ ¼ I
2
i Ij
ðI1 þ I2Þ2
; YiðGiÞ ¼ I
2
i
4Ij
; and YjðGiÞ ¼ Ii
2
 I
2
i
4Ij
: ð10Þ
When I1 ¼ I2 the Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg equilibria coincide. We analyze
the more interesting case with I14I2 depicted in Fig. 5. In the Cournot–Nash
equilibrium, since P1ð:Þ41=2; we call party 1 the favorite, and 2 the ‘‘underdog’’
using Dixit’s [5] terminology.18 Although it would not undermine our results, we
avoid corner Stackelberg outcomes by assuming I24I1=2: Before proceeding, note
the following ordering for our asymmetric case:
I2=4oY1ðG0ÞoY1ðG1Þ and Y2ðG2ÞoY2ðG0ÞoI1=4: ð11Þ
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Fig. 5. Rent-seeking game.
18Dixit [5] analyzes an alternative specification of the rent-seeking game.
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Now consider the two-period accumulation game applied to this model. Although
the reaction functions are non-monotonic, Theorem 1 continues to hold. We sketch
the argument. Observe that if the game is played in the space ðY1; Y2ÞA½I2=4; I1 
½0; I1=4; the monotonicity of the reaction functions would hold and Theorem 1 could
be applied (also redefining agent 1’s strategic variable so it has lower bound of zero).
The game on the restricted strategy set requires y11XI2=4 and Y2pI1=4 (rather than
Y2pI2). The latter restrictions do not change the play of the unrestricted game.
Consider Y2pI1=4: First we argue that y12 ¼ I1=4 is always a better play for party
2 than any y124I1=4: By drawing party 2’s implied second-period reaction functions
for any y12XI1=4; one can see that party 2 would commit himself to y
2
2 ¼ 0 for any of
these choices, and the equilibrium would have ðY1; Y2Þ ¼ ðf 1ðy12Þ; y12Þ: Party 2 is
better off at ðf 1ðI1=4Þ; I1=4Þ than at any other of these points, implying that y124I1=4
is never an equilibrium choice.19 Hence, the constraint y12pI1=4 is innocuous.
Similarly, party 2 would never want to increase Y2 above I1=4 in the second period.
20
Requiring that party 1 choose at least I2=4 in the first period is also harmless. If
y12A½0; Y2ðG0Þ; the continuation equilibrium is at G0 for any y11A½0; I2=4: Similarly,
for any y12A½Y2ðG0Þ; I1=4; the continuation equilibrium is at f 1ðy12Þ for any
y11A½0; I2=4: Hence, requiring that y11 be at least I2=4 does not affect the equilibrium
set.
Applying Theorem 1 then, the equilibrium set is given by:
S ¼ fðY1; Y2Þ is such that Y2 ¼ f 2ðY1Þ and Y1ðG0ÞpY1pY1ðG1Þg: ð12Þ
First, observe that the Stackelberg outcome where the ‘‘underdog’’ leads cannot be
sustained as an equilibrium. In the case depicted in Fig. 5, if the underdog were to
choose his Stackelberg leadership amount the first period, then the equilibrium
would have the ‘‘favorite’’ choose his Stackelberg leadership amount the first period
too, and second-period choices would lead to the favorite’s Stackelberg-leadership
outcome. The underdog cannot lead because his incentive is to increase effort in the
second period. This is in sharp contrast to Baik and Shogren [2] and Leininger [11].
They find that the underdog-leadership outcome is the unique equilibrium if each
party can take action in only one of two periods, and they initially and publicly
commit to their period of action.21 If a commitment to taking action only once is
infeasible, then the outcome is very different.
The continuum of equilibria that arises in this case of the accumulation game is
similar to that which arises in Saloner’s problem. In the next section, we will see that
discounting eliminates the possibility of a continuum, while preserving either the
Cournot–Nash or one or both (modified) leadership outcomes as equilibria.
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20We should probably note that constraining Y2 more tightly to not exceed I2=4 is also innocuous. The
argument goes through for either restriction, the key being that 2’s standard reaction function is
unconstrained.
21This is an application of ‘‘the observable delay game’’ of Hamilton and Slutsky [8].
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We find in the rent-seeking example that the possibility of early actions works to
the advantage of the favorite in the sense that this introduces equilibria with his
leadership. More generally, we have shown that whether equilibrium has leadership
or not is endogenous to the setting.
5. Discounting
Until now we have assumed that the cost of action remains constant across
periods, i.e., there is no discounting. This is appropriate when initial actions
constitute only committed minima or, as an approximation, when period lengths are
short. In such cases, only strategic considerations determine when agents take
actions in equilibrium. If there is discounting, however, the previous analysis needs
to be modified. Let rX0 be the discount rate. To allow for (possible) income effects,
we explicitly introduce the numeraire good consumption, xi; into the utility function,
denoted here UiðYi; YjÞ  Uˆiðxi; Yi; YjÞ; and assume without loss of generality that
Uˆ1ð:Þ40: In the second period, agent i solves
½Pd  max
y2
i
Uˆiðxi; Yi; YjÞ
s:t:
0py2ipIi  ð1þ rÞy1i ;
xi þ ð1þ rÞy1i þ y2i ¼ Ii;
where Ii is agent i’s second-period income.
22
Defining the adjusted income as I˜i ¼ Ii  ry1i ; the program ½Pd  can be rewritten as
½P0d  max
Yi
UˆiðI˜i  Yi; Yi; YjÞ
s:t:
y1ipYipI˜i
Note that ½P0d  is equivalent to ½P above except that the former utilizes the adjusted
income. Thus, the solution to ½P0d  is
Yi ¼ maxfy1i ; f iðYj j I˜iÞg; ð13Þ
where f iðYj j I˜iÞ denotes agent i’s one-period reaction function, conditional on the
adjusted income.
Given (5.1) and letting YiðG0 j I˜i; I˜jÞ denote the one-period Cournot–Nash
outcome conditional on the adjusted incomes, we can state the following variant
of Lemma 1 for the discounting case:
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period.
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Lemma 2. The following strategies constitute the unique continuation equilibrium in
the second period.
y2i ðy1i ; y1j Þ ¼
0 if y1iXf
iðy1j j y1i Þ and y1jXf jðy1i j y1j Þ;
YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ  y1i if y1ipYiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ and y1jpYjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ;
0 if y1iXYiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ and y1jpf jðy1i j y1j Þ;
f iðy1j j y1i Þ  y1i if y1jXYjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ and y1ipf iðy1j j y1i Þ;
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
where we find it more convenient to make the dependence on the choices ðy1i ; y1j Þ explicit,
by suppressing the exogenous values ðIi; Ij; rÞ and writing f iðYj j I˜iÞ  ½f iðYj j y1i Þ; and
YiðG0 j I˜i; I˜jÞ  ½YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ:
Two remarks are in order here. First, ½P0d  reduces to ½P for r ¼ 0: Second, for
r40; in general, two additional effects come into play when agents take early
actions: (1) there is the intertemporal substitution effect, as taking an early action is
now costlier; and (2) there is the income effect, as taking an early action reduces the
adjusted income, which may in turn shift the one-period reaction function. The latter
effect is not present, however, in settings where agents have quasi-linear utility
functions: Uˆiðxi; Yi; YjÞ ¼ aixi þ FiðYi; YjÞ for some ai40: This is because, in such
settings, the one-period reaction function and thus the Cournot–Nash outcome are
independent of the adjusted income. While it is conceivable that agents might possess
quasi-linear utilities in many interesting applications, such utilities are typical for
firms in duopoly games.23 In what follows, we allow for income effects, but place an
assumption on their sign, which is to be satisfied in many (if not most) cases,
including cases with no income effects.
To motivate Assumption 2 below, in ½P0d ; let V iðy1i ; YjÞ be agent i’s continuation
equilibrium utility given his first-period choice and j’s accumulated amount.
Consider now the following local comparative static: Suppose that agent i increases
y1i slightly in cases where the continuation equilibrium would begin and stay at the
Cournot–Nash outcome. That is, even after the change in y1i ; the conditions in
Lemma 2 that y1ipYiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ and y1jpYjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ are satisfied. Given Yj ¼
YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ and applying the Envelope Theorem to ½P0d  at the Cournot–Nash
outcome yields
@V iðy1i ; YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j ÞÞ
@y1i

G0
¼ rUˆi1ð:Þ þ Uˆi3ð:Þ
@YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ
@y1i
 l1  rl2; ð14Þ
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#Pi ¼ xi þ PiðQi ; QjÞQi  Ii ; yielding our model with quasi-linear utility function.
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where l1 and l2 are nonnegative Lagrange multipliers for the constraints, y1ipYi and
YipI˜i in ½P0d ; respectively. Given our assumption that the continuation equilibrium
is at the Cournot–Nash outcome, neither constraint binds implying l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 0:
The first term on the r.h.s. of (14) represents the negative substitution effect. The
second term comes from the income effect, as an increase in y1i reduces i’s adjusted
income. As observed above, when agents have quasi-linear utility functions, there is
no income effect and thus the second term vanishes. This implies that the expression
in (14) has a negative sign in such cases. Intuitively, these are the cases where the
discounting introduces only the cost allocation incentive across periods. When there
is an income effect however, the sign of (14) will continue to be negative unless this
effect is positive and sufficiently large. For simplicity, we make the following
assumption, the first part holding trivially in cases without income effects and
holding as well in many cases with income effects:
Assumption 2. (a) If there are positive income effects on the r.h.s. of (14), the
substitution effect is sufficiently negative to render
@Við:Þ
@y1i

G0
o0:
(b) If there are income effects, then goods ðxi; YiÞ are weakly normal.
Part (a) of Assumption 2 implies that if agent i knows that the equilibrium will be
at a Cournot–Nash point, then he will shift all his action to the second and less costly
period. As we will see below, this puts additional burden on being a leader.24 The
normality assumption in part (b) implies that the one-period reaction function shifts
downward with a decrease in the adjusted income.
Theorem 2 presents the main result of this section. For its statement, let YiðGi j rÞ
denote agent i’s Stackelberg-leader amount where i’s action costs are ð1þ rÞYi and
j takes all actions in the second period: YiðGi j rÞ ¼ arg maxYi UˆiðIi  ð1þ
rÞYi; Yi; f jðYi j 0ÞÞ:
Theorem 2. If Assumption 2 holds, then a ðYi; YjÞ equilibrium pair must satisfy one of
the following:
I: fðy1i ¼ y1j ¼ 0Þ; ðy2i ¼ YiðG0 j 0; 0Þ; y2j ¼ YjðG0 j 0; 0Þg
II: fðy1i ¼ YiðGi j rÞ; y1j ¼ 0Þ; ðy2i ¼ 0; y2j ¼ f jðy1i j 0ÞÞg
Theorem 2 implies that any equilibrium must either be the Cournot–Nash
equilibrium with all actions in the second period, or a variant of a Stackelberg
equilibrium with marginal action cost of 1þ r: Since y1j ¼ 0 in both types of
equilibria, agent i must be indifferent between the Cournot–Nash equilibrium and
the r-dependent leadership equilibrium if both types are to arise, obviously implying
either Type I or Type II equilibria arise generically.25 The Proof of Theorem 2 shows
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analyzed using similar techniques.
25Existence is easy to show given our restrictions to well-behaved cases.
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that a necessary condition for Type II equilibrium is that y1i4YiðG0 j y1i ; 0Þ for y1i ¼
YiðGi j rÞ: To make a credible commitment to being the leader, agent i has to take
sufficiently large initial action. This reinforces our previous finding in Proposition 2
that gaining leadership requires some minimal initial commitment. In fact, we can
state the following corollary to Proposition 2:26
Corollary 1. If Assumption 2 holds and YiðGi j rÞpYiðG0 j 0; 0Þ for both agents, then
the unique equilibrium is the Cournot–Nash outcome with all actions in the second
period.
Theorem 2 also implies that both agents’ taking positive actions early on cannot
be part of an equilibrium. The reason why one agent might take early action when it
is more costly is to gain a leadership advantage. Given that one agent does so, it is
best for the other to follow by shifting all his action to the less costly period. This
rules out the possibility of the continuum of equilibria that we sometimes
encountered in the no-discounting case. In cases like Saloner’s, all actions must be
taken in the first period (except in the pure Stackelberg outcomes). In such cases,
given the ‘‘partial’’ leader commits to his action, the follower is actually indifferent
about when to take action, as there is no cost difference across periods. However,
this indifference breaks down with discounting and the follower would postpone all
his action to the second and less costly period. This permits at most one equilibrium
with player i leading.
Which of the three possible equilibria can prevail depends on the structure of the
specific game as well as the discount rate. Given agent j does nothing in the first
period, agent i would decide whether to engender the Cournot–Nash outcome in the
second period by taking no early action, or to engender the Stackelberg outcome
where he leads. For instance, it is clear that if the first-period action is sufficiently
costly, this will take away all the benefits of leadership and the Cournot–Nash
outcome with actions in the second period will prevail. Being the Stackelberg leader
pays off only if the discount rate is small enough. Regardless of how small the
discount rate is, however, no agent may attempt to lead since the leadership amount
may be insufficient to commit the agent to no future action as without discounting
(see Corollary 1 above).
Our analysis of discounting builds on the insightful paper by Pal [16], who
introduces an intertemporal cost differential of production into Saloner’s homo-
genous good duopoly game. Like us, he also notes the disappearance of the
continuum of equilibria, and characterizes the three possible equilibria described in
Theorem 2 for Saloner’s setting. Our analysis, in addition to applying to a larger set
of cases including those entailing income effects, highlights the importance of the
underlying game structure in predicting the equilibrium outcome as well as the role
of the discount rate. Now we illustrate these points in two of our previous
applications in Section 4.
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Consider the symmetric version of the differentiated product duopoly game in
Section 4 now with discounting. That is, suppose the first-period production costs
ð1þ rÞm dollars per unit while the cost of production in the second period is m
dollars per unit. Since there are no income effects here, Assumption 2 holds trivially.
Applying Theorem 2, suppose firm 1 produces nothing in the first period, implying
that firm 2 has two options to consider: (a) It can engender the Cournot–Nash
outcome by producing only in the second period. That is, we have:
q2ðG0Þ ¼ a m
2bþ g and P
2ðG0Þ ¼ bða mÞ
2
2ð2b2  g2Þ: ð15Þ
(b) It can engender the Stackelberg outcome by producing in the first period. This
yields
q2ðG2 j rÞ ¼ ða mÞð2b gÞ  2bmr
2ð2b2  g2Þ
and P2ðG2 j rÞ ¼ ða mÞ
2ð2b gÞ2  4b2m2r2
8bð2b2  g2Þ : ð16Þ
Comparing the payoffs, in equilibrium firm 2 would like to lead if and only if ror;
where r ¼ ða mÞg
2
2bð2bþ gÞm: However, firm 2 must also satisfy the condition that
q2ðG2 j rÞ4q2ðG0Þ to be the leader as discussed above. This condition is satisfied for
ror: When the discount rate is sufficiently small, either Stackelberg equilibrium
arises. For r4r; firms produce only in the second period resulting in the Cournot–
Nash outcome.27 For r ¼ r; all three equilibria are possible. Recalling the results
above with no discounting, we find that discounting eliminates the continuum in the
case of substitutes, and, generally, makes the Cournot–Nash outcome more likely.
From (16), we see that when the Stackelberg outcome arises, the leader produces less
due to the increased cost of producing early.
Now consider the standard model of public good provision, where agents have
Cobb–Douglas utility functions:
Uiðxi; Yi þ YjÞ ¼ xiðYi þ YjÞ: ð17Þ
The one-period reaction functions are given by
f iðYjÞ ¼ Ii  Yj
2
; ð18Þ
where Ii is agent i’s (second-period) income. Also, the one-period Cournot–Nash
equilibrium is
Y1ðG0Þ ¼ 2I1  I2
3
and Y2ðG0Þ ¼ 2I2  I1
3
: ð19Þ
To guarantee this equilibrium is interior, we assume I1=2oI2o2I1:
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Turning to the accumulation game with discounting, let Ii denote the value of
income in the second period. It is easy to see that while the income effect is positive in
this example, Assumption 2 still holds. As we argued in Section 4 with r ¼ 0;
YiðGi j rÞpYiðG0 j 0; 0Þ in the standard model of public good provision. Further-
more, since YiðGi j rÞ is decreasing in r; we also have YiðGi j rÞpYiðG0 j 0; 0Þ for any
r40: Thus, one can appeal to the Corollary 1 and conclude that the unique
equilibrium is the second period Cournot–Nash outcome. Intuitively, if an agent
cannot commit to a high enough initial action in the no-discounting setting to
exercise leadership, then the same agent will not be able to do so when the initial
action is costlier. It is worth noting that unlike the previous example, the underlying
game structure of this setting is such that regardless of the discount rate, no
Stackelberg outcome arises in equilibrium.
6. Extensions
6.1. The decumulation game
In some two-period settings, agents’ first-period decisions may bind them to a
maximum final value of their strategic variable. Here decumulation is the only
strategic option. For example, two competing political candidates who announce
favored tax rates may find themselves effectively bound to supporting no higher rates
during a campaign. They might revise their initially announced tax positions
downward, while changing platform to support a higher rate would be the kiss of
death. Another conceivable example is duopolists competing in prices who can pre-
announce price. While setting a lower price before transactions take place is an
option, increasing price above the pre-announced price may alienate customers and/
or invite antitrust scrutiny. The implied ‘‘decumulation game’’ can be readily
analyzed within our framework by just redefining strategies and applying results
from the accumulation game. We illustrate our point by an example.
Consider again the differentiated duopoly model analyzed in Section 4 above.
However, we now assume that firms engage in price competition, and write the
demand functions by inverting (5) as
qi ¼ ai  bipi þ cpj; ð20Þ
where we let d ¼ b1b2  g2; ai ¼ ðaibj  ajgÞ=d; bi ¼ bj=d; and c ¼ g=d: Note that ai
and bi are positive due to the assumptions made in Section 4. Duopolist i’s profit
function continues to be Pi ¼ ðpi  miÞqi; and his reaction function is
f iðpjÞ ¼ ai þ bimi
2bi
þ c
2bi
pj: ð21Þ
Suppose that duopolists can pre-announce their prices on ½0; %Pi and then engage in
price competition where the only strategic option is to reduce the pre-announced
price. Here we assume %Pi is high enough to be nonconstraining. Now we make the
following change of variables: pˆti  pti where i; t ¼ 1; 2, which further implies from
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(20) and (21) that qˆi  ai þ bipˆi  cpˆj; #Pi  ðpˆi  miÞqˆi; and
fˆðpˆjÞ  ai þ bimi
2bi
þ c
2bi
pˆj: ð22Þ
Note that the converted model of price competition with actions pˆ1iA½ %Pi; 0;
pˆ2iA½pˆ1i ; 0 and payoffs #Pi is the accumulation game played on ½ %Pi; 0  ½ %Pj; 0:
This game also yields unique Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, as well as
satisfying Assumption 1. Furthermore, since @ #Pi=@pˆj ¼ cðpˆi  miÞ; Proposition 1
implies that pˆiðGiÞppˆiðG0Þ for both firms. Applying Theorem 1 or Proposition 2, this
further implies that the Cournot–Nash outcome is the unique equilibrium of the
modified game. Moreover, by converting the variables back, we conclude that the
Cournot–Nash outcome is also the unique equilibrium of the original decumulation
game. Interestingly, unlike the quantity competition, no firm can exercise leadership
with price competition regardless of whether the products are substitutes or
complements, i.e., regardless of the sign of c: Letting Yi denote the price of duopolist
i; Fig. 3 depicts the (we think) more interesting case of complements. Any attempts
at leadership would fail. If, for example, duopolist 1 set p11 ¼ p1ðG1Þ; then duopolist 2
can engender G0—which 2 prefers to G1—by choosing any p
1
2Xp2ðG0Þ:28
6.2. Arbitrary number of periods
Our analysis up to this point has assumed that agents have two periods to
accumulate their strategic variables. While this two-period framework has provided
valuable insights into the nature of accumulation games, an important question is
whether or not the number of periods has any significant impact on agents’
equilibrium actions and payoffs. To address this question, we extend the basic model
with no discounting presented in Section 3 and let TX2 denote the number of
periods. Here we assume that (pure-strategy and subgame-perfect) equilibria exist in
every subgame and further that these continuation equilibrium sets are continuous in
the state variables. The following is the main result of this section:
Proposition 3. Suppose there is no discounting. If a ðYi; YjÞ pair is an equilibrium
outcome in T periods, then it is also an equilibrium outcome in two periods.
While we are unable to prove points in S necessarily arise as equilibrium outcomes
generally, Proposition 3 narrows the search for equilibria in applications. Consider,
for example, the standard case of contributing to a public good depicted in Fig. 1.
Recall that S is a singleton, the Cournot–Nash point. It is not difficult to confirm
that this outcome arises as an equilibrium when T ¼ 3 by using the techniques in the
analysis of the two-period problem to show agent i can do no better than choose
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y1i ¼ 0 given that y1j ¼ 0: More generally, Proposition 3 implies that increasing the
number of periods does not create new types of equilibria.
7. Concluding remarks
In a number of settings, payoffs depend on the total or final values of agents’
strategic variables and agents have multiple opportunities to increase them.
Examples are contribution games, rent-seeking games, and a number of duopoly
games. We have examined in some detail the two-period, two-player version of this
game. With no discounting, we provide a simple program for identifying the
equilibrium set that can be applied in a variety of settings. Potential equilibria have
outcomes corresponding to the standard Cournot–Nash or Stackelberg equilibria, or
sometimes involve more limited leadership. For leadership to arise, it is necessary
and sufficient that the Stackelberg-leader action is sufficiently high to commit the
leader to no future action. Frequently, only the Cournot–Nash or one or both
Stackelberg equivalents arise. We show further how the results extend when there is
discounting.
We have also considered two extensions to our basic model. First, we let agents
have only the strategic option of decumulating their initial choices. While we have
demonstrated that this case is essentially an accumulation game with the appropriate
change of variables, we note that the actual equilibrium outcomes of a decumulation
game can be markedly different from those of an accumulation game in the original
strategic variables. Second, we let agents have more than two periods to accumulate
their strategic variables within the no-discounting setup. We show that equilibrium
outcomes of the latter game must also be equilibrium outcomes of the two-period
game.
Our framework is open to other promising extensions. For one, our analysis can
be adapted to cases where one agent can only accumulate his strategic variable while
the other agent can only decumulate her strategic variable. The other obvious and
important extension is to more than two agents. This is quite complicated because
there are as many ‘‘standard’’ equilibria as there are agents, N: In addition to the
multi-agent Cournot–Nash equilibrium, there are N Stackelberg equilibria, i.e., any
number up to N could take action first, with the remaining agents moving second.
These extensions await future research.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume
@Ui
@Yj
@f j
@Yi

G0
40: In the Cournot–Nash equilibrium
ðG0Þ; both agents are on their reaction functions so that
@Ui
@Yi
¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2: ðA:1Þ
In the Stackelberg equilibrium where i leads ðGiÞ; j is on his reaction function
whereas i satisfies the following first-order condition:
@Ui
@Yi
þ @U
i
@Yj
@f j
@Yi
¼ 0: ðA:2Þ
If we evaluate (A.2) at G0; then the first term vanishes by (A.1). Thus, the strict
quasi-concavity of UiðYi; f jðYiÞÞ in Yi and @U
i
@Yj
@f j
@Yi

G0
40 imply that
YiðGiÞ4YiðG0Þ:
Using an analogous argument, the results when
@Ui
@Yj
@f j
@Yi

G0
is negative or zero
easily follow. &
Proof of Lemma 1. First we establish another lemma.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that there is a unique interior Cournot–Nash equilibrium in the
one-period game (as we have already assumed). Also suppose that Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ for a
feasible ðYi; YjÞ; i.e., on ½0; Ii  ½0; Ij: Then YioYiðG0Þ if and only if Yiof iðYjÞ:
Proof. Define the functions f ðxÞ  f iðf jðxÞÞ and FðxÞ  f ðxÞ  x: Note that the
Cournot–Nash equilibrium ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ is such that YiðG0Þ is a fixed point of
f ð:Þ; and YiðG0Þ ¼ f iðYjðG0ÞÞ: Also note that FðYiðG0ÞÞ ¼ 0: Since YiA½0; Ii], we
have FðIiÞp0 and Fð0ÞX0:
ð)Þ Suppose for some feasible ðYi; YjÞ pair we have Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ and YioYiðG0Þ:
Suppose, however, that YiXf iðYjÞ: That is, YiXf ðYiÞ; or FðYiÞp0: Since Fð0ÞX0
and Fð:Þ is continuous, from the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists some
Y˜iA½0; Yi such that FðY˜iÞ ¼ 0: However, then ðY˜i; Y˜jÞaðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ where Y˜i
and Y˜j ¼ f jðY˜iÞ is another Cournot–Nash equilibrium, which contradicts the
uniqueness assumption.
ð(Þ Suppose now that for some feasible ðYi; YjÞ pair we have Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ and
Yiof iðYjÞ: However, suppose YiXYiðG0Þ: Here Yiof ðYiÞ; or FðYiÞ40: Since
FðIiÞp0 and Fð:Þ is continuous, there exists some Y˜iAðYi; Ii such that FðY˜iÞ ¼ 0:
However, then ðY˜i; Y˜jÞaðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ where Y˜i and Y˜j ¼ f jðY˜iÞ is another
equilibrium, again contradicting uniqueness. &
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First we show the strategies in Lemma 1 are equilibrium strategies, and then we
show that they are unique. Consider the second period strategies and suppose
y1iXf
iðy1j Þ and y1jXf jðy1i Þ: Given that y2j ¼ 0; y2i ¼ 0 since Uið:Þ is quasi-concave in
ðYi; YjÞ: Now suppose y1ipYiðG0Þ and y1jpYjðG0Þ: Further suppose y2j ¼ YjðG0Þ 
y1j is given. This implies Yj ¼ YjðG0Þ: Since YiðG0Þ  y1iX0; and by definition agent
i’s best response to YjðG0Þ is YiðG0Þ; we have y2i ¼ YiðG0Þ  y1i :
In the third case of Lemma 1, suppose that y1iXYiðG0Þ and y1jpf jðy1i Þ: Further
suppose that y2j ¼ f jðy1i Þ  y1j is given, implying that Yj ¼ f jðy1i Þ: From Lemma A.1,
then y1iXf
iðYjÞ: This implies that y2i ¼ 0 is the best response due to quasi-concavity
of Uið:Þ in ðYi; YjÞ: Given y2i ¼ 0; obviously y2j ¼ f jðy1i Þ  y1j is the best response for
agent j: Finally, consider the last case of the second-period strategies. Given y2j ¼ 0;
since y1ipf iðy1j Þ; y2i ¼ f iðy1j Þ  y1i is the best response for agent i: Now given y2i ¼
f iðy1j Þ  y1i ; i.e., Yi ¼ f iðy1j Þ; y2j ¼ 0 is the best response for agent j as for agent i in
the previous case.
Uniqueness can be seen as follows. By quasi-concavity of UiðYi; YjÞ; the second-
period reaction of agent i satisfies:
yˆ2i ðYj; y1i Þ ¼
f iðYjÞ  y1i if y1ipf iðYjÞ;
0 if y1iXf
iðYjÞ;
(
ðA:3Þ
where it is convenient to write yˆ2i in terms of Yj (rather than y
2
j Þ: Now write agent i’s
second-period reaction function in terms of his total Yi:
fˆ iðYj; y1i Þ  yˆ2i þ y1i ¼ maxff iðYjÞ; y1i g;
the latter equality by (A.3). Second-period equilibrium is at the intersection of fˆ i and
fˆ j: Given f i and f j have a unique intersection, so too do fˆ i and fˆ j : This can be seen
easily in two steps. Relative to f i; fˆ i is ‘‘shifted out’’ over a range to a constant value.
Given monotonicity of f j; clearly fˆ i and f j have a unique intersection. Now ‘‘shift
out’’ f j to fˆ j; with a unique intersection of fˆ i and fˆ j by the same logic. &
Proof of Theorem 1. We proceed by first showing conditions Si; i ¼ 1; 2;y; 5 are
necessary for equilibrium.
ð)Þ Suppose that ðYi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome. We show that it satisfies the
conditions of Si; i ¼ 1; 2;y; 5 respectively.
ðS1Þ: The conditions of S1 trivially hold by (A.3).
ðS2Þ: Suppose the equilibrium pair is not in S2: Then, given the point is in S1;
Yi4f iðYjÞ for both agents. Eq. (A.3) implies and y2i ¼ y2j ¼ 0 and so y1i4f iðy1j Þ for
each agent. However, in the first period, given j’s contribution agent i would be
better off by reducing his amount to f iðy1j Þ; a contradiction.
ðS3Þ: Given Yiaf iðYjÞ; it must be that Yi4f iðYjÞ since the pair is in S1:
From (A.3), it must also be that y2i ¼ 0 and thus y1i ¼ Yi: Since Yi4f iðYjÞ; we have
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Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ since ðYi; YjÞ is in S2: Now we argue that because y1i4YiðGiÞ; agent i
could increase his utility by marginally reducing his first period choice.
If y1j is such that following the marginal reduction in y
1
i ; agent j can choose y
2
j such
that Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ; then agent i is better off due to the quasi-concavity of UiðYi; f jðYiÞÞ
in Yi: If, however, y
1
j is such that following the marginal reduction in y
1
i ; agent j
cannot choose y2j such that Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ; i.e., if y1j4f jðYiÞ; then Yj would be
unchanged. In the latter case, agent i is better off since y1i4f
iðYjÞ and UiðYi; YjÞ is
quasi-concave.
ðS4Þ: Suppose that ðYi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome with Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ: Suppose,
however, that YioYiðGiÞ and YjoYjðGiÞ: Since the pair is in S1; we have YiXf iðYjÞ:
Thus from Lemma A.1, YiXYiðG0Þ; which implies YiðG0ÞoYiðGiÞ: Given agent j’s
first-period strategy, agent i can engender ðYiðGiÞ; YjðGiÞÞ as an equilibrium
outcome where he would be better off.
To see this, let y1i ¼ YiðGiÞ: Then since YiðGiÞ4YiðG0Þ and y1jpYjoYjðGiÞ ¼
f jðy1i Þ; agent i’s second-period strategy dictates y2i ¼ 0 (by Lemma A.1). Again since
y1joYjðGiÞ and YiðGiÞ4YiðG0Þ; by Lemma 1, y2j ¼ f jðy1i Þ  y1j ¼ YjðGiÞ  y1j : Thus
Yj ¼ YjðGiÞ:
ðS5Þ: Suppose that ðYi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome with Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ: Suppose,
however, that UiðYi; YjÞomaxY˜i UiðY˜i; f jðY˜iÞÞ subject to f jðY˜iÞXYj and
Y˜iXf iðf jðY˜iÞÞ; where we are then assuming the constraint set is not empty. (If the
constraint set is empty, then ðS5Þ is automatically satisfied.) Let Y˜i denote the
solution to the latter optimization problem. We now show that agent i engenders
ðY˜i ; f jðY˜i ÞÞ in equilibrium by choosing y˜1i ¼ Y˜i : The second-period equilibrium
would have y˜2j ¼ f jðY˜i Þ  y˜1j and y2i ¼ 0 as we now confirm. Taking y˜2i ¼ 0 as given
and using the fact that y˜1jpYj; we know by the first constraint on the above
maximization that f jðY˜i ÞXy1j : Using (A.3), this implies that y˜2j ¼ f jðY˜i Þ  y˜1j : Now
take the latter, i.e., agent j’s second-period strategy as given. The second constraint
on the above maximization problem along y˜1i ¼ Y˜i implies y˜1iXf iðf jðy˜1i ÞÞ; which by
Lemma A.1, implies y˜1iXYiðG0Þ: This and y˜1jpf jðy˜1i Þ imply y˜2i ¼ 0 by Lemma 1.
Hence, y˜1i ¼ Y˜i does engender ðY˜i ; f jðY˜i ÞÞ in equilibrium, implying the necessity
of ðS5Þ:
ð(Þ Take any ðYi; YjÞ in S: There are two cases:
Case 1: Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ and Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ:
In this case, of course, Yi ¼ YiðG0Þ and Yj ¼ YjðG0Þ: Claim 1 below shows that if
S4 is satisfied for both agents, then y
1
i ¼ YiðG0Þ; y1j ¼ YjðG0Þ; and y2i ¼ y2j ¼ 0 make
up an equilibrium.
Case 2: Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ and Yjaf jðYiÞ:
It must be that Yj4f jðYiÞ and YjpYjðGjÞ since the pair is in S1 and S3;
respectively. Also, since Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ; being in S4 implies either YjXYjðGjÞ or
YiXYiðGjÞ: From Lemma A.1, we have Yj4YjðG0Þ: There are two possibilities.
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Suppose that YjoYjðGjÞ: Then YiXYiðGjÞ due to being in S4: Claim 2 below
shows that such a pair is supported as an equilibrium outcome so long as S5 is
satisfied. Now consider Yj ¼ YjðGjÞ: This means Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ ¼ YiðGjÞ: It is
straightforward to show that when S5 is satisfied, this pair can be supported as an
equilibrium by the second-period strategies together with y1j ¼ YjðGjÞ and y1i ¼ 0:
Given Claims 1 and 2 below, the proof is complete. &
Claim 1. ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ is an equilibrium outcome under the following cases:
Case 1: YiðG0Þ4YiðGiÞ and YiðG0Þ4YiðGjÞ;i.e., at least one agent’s Cournot–
Nash strategy exceeds both his Stackelberg leader’s and follower’s strategy.
Proof. Suppose y1j ¼ YjðG0Þ is given. If y1i4YiðG0Þ; then y2i ¼ 0 by Lemma 1, i.e.,
either the first or third cases must be satisfied. In this case, there are two possibilities.
If y1jXf
jðy1i Þ; then y2j ¼ 0 again by Lemma 1. However, y1i ¼ YiðG0Þ is better for
agent i due to quasi-concavity of Uið:Þ in (Yi; YjÞ: (Both agents would continue to
choose zero in the second period.) On the other hand, if y1jof jðy1i Þ; then y2j ¼
f jðy1i Þ  y1j by Lemma 1. Since the resulting outcome is on agent j’s reaction function
and Yi4YiðG0Þ4YiðGiÞ; agent i is worse off than y1i ¼ YiðG0Þ due to strict quasi-
concavity of UiðYi; f jðYiÞÞ in Yi: Thus, y1i ¼ YiðG0Þ is always a better response than
y1i4YiðG0Þ and would lead to the outcome (YiðG0Þ; YjðG0Þ:
Now consider the possibility of y1ipYiðG0Þ: Then, y2j ¼ 0 and y2i ¼ YiðG0Þ  y1i by
Lemma 1. Thus, the resulting outcome is Yi ¼ YiðG0Þ: As a result, given y1i ¼
YjðG0Þ; y1i ¼ YiðG0Þ is a best response for agent i:
Suppose now that y1i ¼ YiðG0Þ is given. Since YiðG0Þ ¼ f iðYjðG0ÞÞ4f iðYjðGjÞÞ ¼
YiðGjÞ by hypothesis, we analyze two cases regarding the monotonicity of f ið:Þ: If
f ið:Þ is upward sloping, then we must have YjðGjÞoYjðG0Þ; where y1j ¼ YjðG0Þ would
be a best response for agent j from the above discussion for agent i: (We only used
the condition YiðG0Þ4YiðGiÞ there.) If, on the other hand, f ið:Þ is downward
sloping, then YjðG0ÞoYjðGjÞ: Consider y1joYjðG0Þ: Then, y2i ¼ 0 and y2j ¼ YjðG0Þ 
y1j by Lemma 1, implying Yi ¼ YiðG0Þ and Yj ¼ YjðG0Þ: Thus, y1j ¼ YjðG0Þ yields
the same payoff for j: Now consider y1j4YjðG0Þ: Then y1i4f iðy1j Þ and y1j4
YjðG0Þ ¼ f jðy1i Þ; implying that y2i ¼ y2j ¼ 0 by Lemma 1. However, y1j ¼ YjðG0Þ
is a better response. Thus, given y1i ¼ YiðG0Þ; y1j ¼ YjðG0Þ is a best response for
agent j:
Overall, since, y1i ¼ YiðG0Þ and y1j ¼ YjðG0Þ are equilibrium strategies
with second-period strategies y2i ¼ y2j ¼ 0; ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ is an equilibrium
outcome.
Case 2: YjðG0Þ4YjðGiÞ and YiðG0Þ4YiðGjÞ; i.e., both Cournot–Nash strategies
exceed their Stackelberg followers’ strategies.
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Proof. We have YjðG0Þ ¼ f jðYiðG0ÞÞ4f jðYiðGiÞÞ ¼ YjðGiÞ and YiðG0Þ ¼
f iðYjðG0ÞÞ4f iðYjðGjÞÞ ¼ YiðGjÞ: If both reaction functions are upward sloping, it
must be that YiðG0Þ4YiðGiÞ and YjðG0Þ4YjðGjÞ: In this case, the conditions of Case
1 are satisfied for both agents, and the same argument applies. Again, then, y1i ¼
YiðG0Þ and y1j ¼ YjðG0Þ together with y2i ¼ y2j ¼ 0 make up an equilibrium with the
totals of ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ:
If f ið:Þ is upward sloping and f jð:Þ is downward sloping, then we have
YjðG0Þ4YjðGjÞ; YiðG0ÞoYiðGiÞ; and the conditions of Case 1 are satisfied for
agent j: Again ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ is an equilibrium outcome. It is also easy to show
that when both reaction functions are downward sloping, the Cournot–Nash
outcome is supported as the equilibrium again with ðy1i ; y1j Þ ¼ ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ and
ðy2i ; y2j Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ: (Either agent reducing their first-period strategy would lead to the
same outcome. If an agent increase his first-period strategy, ðy2i ; y2j Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ
continues to hold, and that agent would be worse off.) &
Claim 2. ðYi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome if Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ and YjðG0ÞoYjoYjðGjÞ;
YiXYiðGjÞ; and UiðYi; YjÞXmaxY˜i UiðY˜i; f jðY˜iÞÞ subject to f jðY˜iÞXYj and
Y˜iXf iðf jðY˜iÞÞ:
Proof. First note that since Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ and YjðG0ÞoYj ; we have Yj4f jðYiÞ from
Lemma A.1. Now observe that since YjðGjÞ4YjðG0Þ; from Proposition 1 we have
@Uj
@Yi
@f i
@Yj
 
must be positive. Suppose both
@Uj
@Yi
and
@f i
@Yj
are positive. Then, since
YjoYjðGjÞ; Yi ¼ f iðYjÞof iðYjðGjÞÞ ¼ YiðGjÞ; a contradiction. Thus, both deriva-
tives must be negative. This immediately implies that YioYiðG0Þ: Now we show that
y1i ¼ Yi; y1j ¼ Yj together with the second-period strategies in Lemma 1 constitute an
equilibrium.
Suppose y1i ¼ Yi is given and suppose y1j ¼ Yj is not a best response for agent j: If
y1jpYjðG0Þ; then the second-period strategies dictate y2i ¼ YiðG0Þ  Yi and y2j ¼
YjðG0Þ  y1j ; which is a worse outcome for agent j than (Yi; YjÞ due to strict quasi-
concavity of UjðYj; f iðYjÞÞ in Yj: If, however, YjðG0Þoy1joYj; then Yiof iðy1j Þ: In
this case, y2j ¼ 0 and y2i ¼ f iðy1j Þ  Yi; which is again a worse outcome for agent j for
the same reason.
Assume instead that y1j4Yj: Then, y
1
j4f
jðYiÞ and y1i4f iðy1j Þ: Thus, y2i ¼ y2j ¼ 0:
However, agent j is worse off due to quasi-concavity of Ujð:Þ in (Yi; Yj). Thus,
y1j ¼ Yj is a best response.
Now we take y1j ¼ Yj as given and show y1i ¼ Yi is a best response. Consider any
y1ioYi: Then y1iof iðy1j Þ and we are given y1j ¼ Yj4YjðG0Þ: Lemma 1 implies y2i ¼
f iðy1j Þ  y1i and y2j ¼ 0; leading to the same outcome (Yi; Yj). Hence, no y1ioYi is
strictly better for agent i:
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For alternatives with y1i4Yi; y
1
i4f
iðy1j Þ; and there are two cases. If f jðYiÞ is
decreasing, then y1j4f
jðy1i Þ since we know y1j ¼ Yj4f jðYiÞ: Here, ðy2i ; y2j Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ
from Lemma 1, and agent i is worse off by quasi-concavity of UiðYi; YjÞ:
If, for y1i4Yi; f
jðYiÞ is increasing, it could still be that y1j4f jðy1i Þ and the same
argument applies. Suppose, however, that y1jpf jðy1i Þ: Since f ið:Þ is downward
sloping (from above) and f jð:Þ is upward sloping, y1i4f iðy1j Þ and y1jpf jðy1i Þ imply
that y1i4YiðG0Þ: Using Lemma 1, then, y1j ¼ f jðy1i Þ  y1j and y2j ¼ 0: By the (last)
condition on agent i’s utility function in Claim 2, agent i is no better off. Hence,
y1i ¼ Yi is a best response.
Since for these first-period strategies Lemma 1 implies ðy2i ; y2j Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ; such that
ðYi; YjÞ indeed constitutes an equilibrium. &
Proof of Proposition 2. ð)Þ Suppose that ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ is the unique equilibrium
outcome. Then, it must be in S; in particular in S4: Since YjðG0Þ ¼ f jðYiðG0ÞÞ; we
must have either
YiðG0ÞXYiðGiÞ or YjðG0ÞXYjðGiÞ: ðA:4Þ
Analogously, since YiðG0Þ ¼ f iðYjðG0ÞÞ; either
YjðG0ÞXYjðGjÞ or YiðG0ÞXYiðGjÞ: ðA:5Þ
Now we develop a contradiction to the uniqueness of the above equilibrium under
the presumption that YiðGiÞ4YiðG0Þ for at least one agent. There are two cases:
Case 1: YiðGiÞ4YiðG0Þ and YjðG0Þ4YjðGjÞ:
Since YiðGiÞ4YiðG0Þ; to satisfy (A.4) we must have YjðG0Þ4YjðGjÞ or YjðG0Þ ¼
f jðYiðG0ÞÞXYjðGiÞ ¼ f jðYiðGiÞÞ; which implies f jð:Þ is downward sloping.
Note that ðYiðGiÞ; YjðGiÞÞ is in S1-S2-S3-S4: If we can show that it also
satisfies S5; then by Theorem 1 it is an equilibrium, a contradiction. Satisfaction of
S5 requires that
UjðYjðGiÞ; YiðGiÞÞXmax
Y˜j
UjðY˜j; f iðY˜jÞÞ
s:t: f iðY˜jÞXYiðGiÞ and Y˜jXf jðf iðY˜jÞÞ:
ðA:6Þ
To satisfy YjðG0Þ4YjðGjÞ; Proposition 1 requires that @U
j
@Yi
@f i
@Yj
o0:
If
@Uj
@Yi
o0; the first constraint on the maximization in (A.6) implies S5 is satisfied.
(Using also that j is on his reaction function at the outcome (YiðGiÞ; YjðGiÞÞ:
If
@Uj
@Yi
40; then
@f i
@Yj
o0; so both reaction functions are downward sloping. Here
the constraint set on the maximization in S5 is empty, so condition S5 is satisfied
trivially. One can see this by drawing the graph with two downward sloping reaction
functions and unique Cournot–Nash equilibrium. More formally, suppose that
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ðY˜i; Y˜jÞ is in the constraint set of the maximization in (A.6). Since Y˜i ¼ f iðY˜jÞ and
Y˜jXf jðY˜iÞ; from Lemma A.1, we have Y˜jXYjðG0Þ: Then, Y˜i ¼ f iðY˜jÞpf iðYjðG0ÞÞ ¼
YiðG0ÞoYiðGiÞpY˜i; the first inequality since f i is downward sloping, the second
inequality as it characterizes Case 1, and the last inequality by the constraint set.
Hence, we have a contradiction. We have shown that equilibrium would not be
unique given YiðGiÞ4YiðG0Þ in Case 1, so YiðGiÞpYiðG0Þ is a necessary condition
for uniqueness of the Cournot–Nash outcome.
Case 2: YiðGiÞ4YiðG0Þ and YjðG0ÞoYjðGjÞ:
To satisfy (A.5), YiðG0ÞXYiðGjÞ: Similar arguments to those in Case 1 show that
f i is downward sloping. Again, similar arguments show that the constraint set on the
maximization in S5 is empty. Again, this implies that (YiðGiÞ; YjðGiÞÞ is an
equilibrium, contradicting uniqueness.
ð(Þ Suppose that YiðGiÞoYiðG0Þ for both agents. Similar arguments of Case 1 of
Claim 1 above show that ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ can be obtained as an equilibrium.
Now suppose that there exists a feasible (Yi; YjÞaðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ that is also an
equilibrium. Then it must be in S: This implies w.l.o.g. Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ and Yjaf jðYiÞ:
This also implies that YjoYjðG0Þ; which follows from having YjpYjðGjÞ and
YjðGjÞoYjðG0Þ by hypothesis. Since agent i is on his reaction function, Lemma A.1
reveals Yjof jðYiÞ: However, this contradicts Yj4f jðYiÞ which must hold since the
pair is in S: &
Proof of Theorem 2. We first start recording four lemmas.
Lemma A.2. In equilibrium, if y1iA½0; YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ; then y1jeð0; YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ:
Proof. Suppose not. That is, suppose y1iA½0; YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ and y1jAð0; YjðG0 j
y1i ; y
1
j Þ: Then, the second-period strategies in Lemma 2 imply that y2i ¼
YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ  y1i and y2j ¼ YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ  y1j : Suppose agent j makes an arbitrarily
small reduction in y1j ; i.e., y
1
j ¼ y1j  e: Since
dYjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ
dy1j
p0 by part (b) of
Assumption 2, we have YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ4YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ; which implies
y1j Að0; YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ: However, there are two possibilities for agent i: If
dYiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ
dy1j
p0; then y1i A½0; YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ: In this case, Lemma 2 dictates y2i ¼
YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ  y1i and y2j ¼ YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ  y1j : That is, the resulting outcome
would be at the new Cournot–Nash equilibrium. Due to part (a) of Assumption 2, this
small reduction strictly benefits agent j; contradicting the equilibrium hypothesis.
If, however,
dYiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ
dy1j
40 and y1i is such that y
1
ie½0; YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ;
i.e., YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þoy1ioYiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ; then, again from Lemma 2, y2i ¼ 0 and
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y2j ¼ f jðy1i j y1j Þ  y1j :As y1j -y1j ; i.e., e-0; y1i-YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ due to the Sandwich
Theorem. Therefore, for arbitrarily small reductions in y1j ; the outcome is arbitrarily
close to the Cournot–Nash outcome. However, agent j would strictly benefit from
shifting his action towards the second period due to part (a) of Assumption 2. &
Lemma A.3. In equilibrium, if y1i4YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ; then y1jeð0; YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ:
Proof. Suppose not. That is, suppose in equilibrium y1i4YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ but
y1jAð0; YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ: Lemma 2 implies y2i ¼ 0: However, given y1i ; agent j could
choose y1j ¼ y1j  e for an arbitrarily small e40 so that y1i4YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ:
Moreover, since
dYjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ
dy1j
o0 from part (b) of Assumption 2, and thus
y1j Að0; YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ; we still have y2i ¼ 0: This means, due to Assumption 2, agent
j strictly benefits from this small reduction in the first period, contradicting the
equilibrium hypothesis. Hence, y1jeð0; YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ: &
Lemma A.4. Both y1i4YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ and y1j4YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ cannot be part of an
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose it can. Then, it is clear from Lemma 2 that at least one agent, say i; has
y2i ¼ 0: Applying the same reasoning in Lemma A.3, we reach a contradiction. &
Lemma A.5. In equilibrium, if y1i4YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ; then y1j ¼ 0:
Proof. Directly follows from Lemmas A.3 and A.4 above. &
Now we turn to the proof of Theorem 2.
Suppose, in equilibrium, y1iAð0; YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ: From Lemma A.2, we must have
either y1j ¼ 0 or y1j4YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ: If y1j ¼ 0; then y2i ¼ YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ  y1i and y2j ¼
YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ due to Lemma 2. That is, agents are at the Cournot–Nash outcome.
However, from Assumption 2, agent i could improve his utility by at least marginally
shifting his total towards the second period. If, on the other hand,
y1j4YjðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ; then Lemma A.5 implies y1i ¼ 0; a contradiction to the
hypothesis. Thus, y1i is either zero or greater than YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ: Since Lemma
A.5 implies that both y1i and y
1
j greater than the Cournot–Nash amounts cannot be
part of an equilibrium. Furthermore, since, when y1i4YiðG0 j y1i ; y1j Þ; Lemma A.5
implies y1j ¼ 0; agent i becomes the Stackelberg leader and chooses YiðGi j rÞ as
defined in the text. This leaves us the cases:
I: fðy1i ¼ y1j ¼ 0Þ; ðy2i ¼ YiðG0 j 0; 0Þ; y2j ¼ YjðG0 j 0; 0Þg
II: fðy1i ¼ YiðGi j rÞ; y1j ¼ 0Þ; ðy2i ¼ 0; y2j ¼ f jðy1i j 0ÞÞg:
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Proof of Corollary 1. Note that for type II equilibrium to arise, one needs to have
y1i ¼ YiðGi j rÞ; and y1i4YiðG0 j y1i ; 0Þ: Since from part (b) of Assumption 2,
YiðG0 j y1i ; 0) is decreasing in y1i ; type II equilibrium requires that
YiðGi j rÞ4YiðG0 j 0; 0Þ: Thus, if no agent’s first period action satisfies this condition,
then the equilibrium must be of type I. &
Appendix B
This appendix contains the proof of Proposition 3. We show below that an
equilibrium outcome in the T-period game must be in the set S: Let Y ti be agent i’s
accumulated amount at the end of period t. For convenience, also let Yi  Y Ti :
Lemma B.1. If ðYi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome, then yTi ¼ maxf0; f iðYjÞ  Y T1i g:
Proof. Using the similar arguments in the two-period game, the result follows. &
Corollary B.1. If (Yi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome, then Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ; hence is in S1:
Proof. This easily follows from Lemma B.1. &
Lemma B.2. If (Yi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome, then Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ for at least one
agent, hence is in S2:
Proof. Take an equilibrium outcome (Yi; YjÞ; and suppose, on the contrary,
Yiaf iðYjÞ for both agents. Then, Yi4f iðYjÞ from Corollary B.1. Furthermore,
Lemma B.1 implies yTi ¼ 0 for both agents. If yT1i 40; then agent i could choose
yˆT1i ¼ yT1i  e; and given that agents use the same last period strategies in period T
as in the two-period case, could engender ðYi  e; YjÞ as the continuation outcome.
However, since by hypothesis, Yi4f iðYjÞ; he would, then be better off, contradicting
the equilibrium assumption. Thus, we must have yT1i ¼ 0 for both agents. For
continuation equilibria beginning in any period t; we assume continuity of the
equilibrium outcome set ðYˆi; YˆjÞ in the state variables (Y t1i ; Y t1j Þ:
Now suppose yT2i 40 and let agent i choose yˆ
T2
i ¼ yT2i  e: This engenders a
continuation outcome ðYˆi; YˆjÞ such that Yˆi4f iðYˆjÞ for both agents. Using the same
argument above for periods T  1 and T ; we conclude that yˆT1i ¼ yˆTi ¼ 0 for both
agents. Thus, Yˆi ¼ Yi  e and Yˆj ¼ Yj: However, given Yi4f iðYjÞ; agent i is strictly
better off by choosing yˆT2i ; contradicting the equilibrium assumption. Hence,
yT2i ¼ 0: Using the exact arguments, one can show inductively that yti ¼ 0 for
tAf1; 2;y; Tg for both agents. However, this contradicts Yi4f iðYjÞ: Hence, Yi ¼
f iðYjÞ for at least one agent. &
Lemma B.3. If (Yi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome and Yiaf iðYjÞ; then YipYiðGiÞ;
hence is in S3:
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Proof. Take (Yi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome and Yiaf iðYjÞ: From Corollary B.1,
this implies Yi4f iðYjÞ: Furthermore, from Lemma B.2, we have Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ: Now,
by way of contradiction, suppose Yi4YiðGiÞ: Since Yi4f iðYjÞ; Lemma B.1 implies
yTi ¼ 0: If yT1i 40; then given that agents use the same equilibrium strategies in
period T as in the two-period case, one can use the same arguments as in the two-
period setting and reach a contradiction to yT1i 40 being part of an equilibrium
path. Thus, we must have yT1i ¼ 0: Now let t0Af1; 2;y; T  2g be the last period in
which yt0i 40; i.e., with the y
t
i ¼ 0 for tAft0 þ 1;y; Tg: Suppose agent i reduces his
period t0 choice by e; i.e., yˆ
t0
i ¼ yt0i  e: This engenders a continuation equilibrium
such that Yˆi4f iðYˆjÞ by continuity of the continuation equilibrium outcome set. If
the continuation equilibrium is also such that Yˆj4f jðYˆiÞ; then a similar argument as
in Lemma B.2 above implies that yˆti ¼ yˆtj ¼ 0 for tAft0 þ 1;y; Tg; which in turn
implies that Yˆi ¼ Yi  e and Yˆj ¼ Yj: However, this means agent i is better off by
choosing yˆt0i ¼ yt0i  e due to the strict quasiconcavity of Uið:Þ in (Yi; YjÞ: If, on the
other hand, the continuation equilibrium is also such that Yˆj ¼ f jðYˆiÞ; then agent i is
again better off due to the strict quasiconcavity of Uið:Þ along j’s reaction function
and the hypothesis Yi4YiðGiÞ: Finally, note that Yˆjof jðYˆiÞ cannot be part of a
continuation equilibrium due to Lemma B.1 above. Thus, yti ¼ 0 for tAf1; 2;y; Tg;
implying that Yi ¼ 0: This, however, contradicts Yi4f iðYjÞ: &
Lemma B.4. If (Yi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome and Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ; then Yi ¼ YiðGiÞ or
Yj ¼ YjðGiÞ; hence is in S4:
Proof. (The proof closely follows the proof of the necessity of S4 in the two-period
game.) Suppose (Yi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome and Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ: However,
suppose, on the contrary, that YioYiðGiÞ and YjoYjðGiÞ: Since Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ and
Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ from Corollary B.1, Lemma A.1 implies Yi ¼ YiðG0Þ; which in turn
implies YiðG0ÞoYiðGiÞ: Now consider period t ¼ T  1: Since, by definition,
Y T1j pYj and Y T1j oYjðGiÞ: We shall argue next that in period T  1; agent i
could engender (YiðGiÞ; YjðGiÞÞ as an equilibrium outcome, and be better off.
To see this, first note that given (Y T1i ; Y
T1
j Þ the equilibrium strategies in Lemma 1
continues to be the unique continuation equilibrium in the TX2 games. Now, given
Y T1j ; let agent i choose yˆ
T1
i ¼ YiðGiÞ  Y T1i so that YˆT1i ¼ yˆT1i þ Y T1i ¼
YiðGiÞ: Then, since YiðG0ÞoYiðGiÞ and Y T1j oYjðGiÞ ¼ f jðYˆT1i Þ; the last period
strategies dictate that yˆTi ¼ 0; and yˆTj ¼ YjðGiÞ  Y T1j so that Yˆj ¼ YjðGiÞ;
completing the proof. &
Lemma B.5. If (Yi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome and Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ; then
UiðYi; YjÞXmaxY˜i UiðY˜i; f jðY˜iÞÞ s:t: f jðY˜iÞXYj and Y˜iXf iðf jðY˜iÞÞ; hence is
in S5:
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Proof. (The proof closely follows the proof of the necessity of S5 in the two-period
case.) Suppose (Yi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome and Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ: Note that if the
constraint set is empty, then the assertion in Lemma B.5 holds trivially. Thus, we
assume the set is nonempty. Let Y˜i denote the solution to the maximization problem.
In Observation 1 below, we show that either Y˜i ¼ YiðG0Þ or YipY˜i : Suppose Y˜i ¼
YiðG0Þ: Then, YjpYjðG0Þ from the first constraint of the maximization.
Furthermore, since Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ; Lemma A.1 implies that Yjpf jðYiÞ: Given that
(Yi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome, we also have Yj ¼ f jðYiÞ: This means Yj ¼
f jðYiÞ: Since Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ by hypothesis, this also means (Yi; YjÞ ¼ ðYiðG0Þ; YjðG0ÞÞ:
Together with Y˜i ¼ YiðG0Þ; the inequality in Lemma B.5 then holds with equality.
Next suppose YipY˜i ; but, on the contrary, that UiðYi; YjÞoUiðY˜i ; f jðY˜i ÞÞ: We
demonstrate now that agent i could engender ðY˜i ; f jðY˜i ÞÞ and be strictly better off
than the outcome (Yi; YjÞ: Consider period T  1; and note that Y T1i pYipY˜i :
Given Y T1j ; let agent i choose yˆ
T1
i ¼ Y˜i  Y T1i : Since, by definition,
Y˜iXf
iðf jðY˜i ÞÞ; Lemma A.1 implies Y˜iXYiðG0Þ: Furthermore, from the constraint
set, we also know Y T1j pYjpf jðY˜i Þ: The last period strategies then dictate that
yˆTi ¼ 0 and yˆTj ¼ f jðY˜i Þ  Y T1j ; yielding ðY˜i ; f jðY˜i ÞÞ as an equilibrium. However,
since, by hypothesis, UiðYi; YjÞoUiðY˜i ; f jðY˜i ÞÞ; agent i has a strict incentive to
deviate in (Yi; YjÞ; contradicting the equilibrium assumption. &
Observation B.1. Let ðYi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome and Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ: Furthermore,
let Y˜i ¼ arg maxY˜i UiðY˜i; f jðY˜iÞÞ s:t: f jðY˜iÞXYj and Y˜iXf iðf jðY˜iÞÞ: Then, either
Y˜i ¼ YiðG0Þ or YipY˜i :
Proof. We consider three cases depending on whether reaction functions are
increasing or decreasing.
* f ið:Þ is increasing: Then, using the constraints successively, we have
Y˜iXf
iðf jðY˜i ÞÞXf iðYjÞ ¼ Yi; which means YipY˜i :
* f ið:Þ is decreasing: In this case, we need to consider the slope of f jð:Þ as well.
(1) f jð:Þ is increasing: Using the first constraint, we have f iðf jðY˜i ÞÞpf iðYjÞ:
Furthermore, given that (Yi; YjÞ is an equilibrium outcome, Corollary B.1 above
implies YjXf jðYiÞ: Since f jð:Þ is decreasing, this further implies f iðYjÞpf iðf jðYiÞÞ:
Overall, we then have f iðf jðY˜i ÞÞpf iðYjÞpf iðf jðYiÞÞ: Since f ið:Þ is decreasing, this
implies) f jðY˜i ÞXf jðYiÞ; which further reveals YipY˜i ; since f jð:Þ is increasing.
(2) f jð:Þ is decreasing: When both reaction functions are decreasing, the constraint
set contains a single point at which Y˜i ¼ YiðG0Þ; and thus Y˜i ¼ YiðG0Þ: To see this,
first note that since Yi ¼ f iðYjÞ and YjXf jðYiÞ; Lemma A.1 implies that YjXYjðG0Þ:
Furthermore, since f ið:Þ is decreasing, this implies YipYiðG0Þ: Now, using the first
constraint and YjXf jðYiÞ; we have f jðY˜iÞXf jðYiÞ; which implies that Y˜ipYi; where
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Y˜i is an arbitrary point in the set. Thus, we have Y˜ipYiðG0Þ: Moreover, together
with Lemma A.1, the second constraint implies that Y˜iXYiðG0Þ: Hence, the only
point in the constraint set is Y˜i ¼ YiðG0Þ; which also implies Y˜i ¼ YiðG0Þ:
Overall then, we either have Y˜i ¼ YiðG0Þ or YipY˜i : &
References
[1] A. Admati, M. Perry, Joint projects without commitment, Rev. Econ. Stud. 58 (1991) 259–276.
[2] K.H. Baik, J.F. Shogren, Strategic behavior in contests: comment, Amer. Econ. Rev. 82 (1992)
359–362.
[3] T. Bergstrom, L. Blume, H. Varian, On the private provision of public goods, J. Public Econ. 29
(1986) 25–49.
[4] A. Dixit, A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers, Bell J. Econ. 10 (1979) 20–32.
[5] A. Dixit, Strategic behavior in contests, Amer. Econ. Rev. 77 (1987) 891–898.
[6] D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
[7] D. Gale, Monotone games with positive spillovers, Games Econ. Behav. 37 (2001) 295–320.
[8] J. Hamilton, S. Slutsky, Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria,
Games Econ. Behav. 2 (1990) 29–46.
[9] J. Hamilton, S. Slutsky, Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games, Theory Dec. 34 (1993)
47–62.
[10] J. Henkel, The 1.5th mover advantage, RAND J. Econ. 33 (2002) 156–170.
[11] W. Leininger, More efficient rent-seeking: a Munchhausen solution, Public Choice 75 (1993) 43–62.
[12] B. Linster, Stackelberg rent-seeking, Public Choice 77 (1993) 307–321.
[13] B. Lockwood, J. Thomas, Gradualism and irreversibility, Rev. Econ. Stud. 69 (2002) 339–357.
[14] G. Maggi, Endogenous leadership in a new market, RAND J. Econ. 27 (1996) 641–659.
[15] L. Marx, S. Matthews, Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project, Rev. Econ. Stud. 67
(2000) 327–358.
[16] D. Pal, Cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials, J. Econ. Theory 55
(1991) 441–448.
[17] R. Romano, H. Yildirim, Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective, J. Public Econ.
81 (2001) 423–447.
[18] G. Saloner, Cournot duopoly with two production periods, J. Econ. Theory 42 (1987) 183–187.
[19] N. Singh, X. Vives, Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly, RAND J. Econ. 15
(1984) 546–554.
[20] J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988.
[21] G. Tullock, Efficient rent-seeking, in: J. Buchanan, R. Tollison, G. Tullock, (Eds.), Toward a Theory
of the Rent-seeking Society, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 1980.
[22] E. Van Damme, S. Hurkens, Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing, Games Econ.
Behav. 15 (1996) 290–311.
[23] H. Varian, Sequential contributions to public goods, J. Public Econ. 53 (1994) 165–186.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
R. Romano, H. Yildirim / Journal of Economic Theory 120 (2005) 73–107 107
